This article was first published in the Times Herald on Oct. 2, 2006
NORRISTOWN — The Pentagon shot down claims by members of the "Able Danger" data-mining project who said they had knowledge of Sept. 11 hijacker Mohamed Atta more than a year before the attacks.
In fact, the Pentagon Inspector General’s (IG) investigation, which was released last week, rejected nearly all of the many allegations leveled against the Defense Department by Army Reserve Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer over its handling of the secret program to gather information on al-Qaida in 1999 and 2000.
The Pentagon report, released last week, also rejected Shaffer’s accusation that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), his civilian employer, retaliated against him for revealing the existence of "Able Danger" to 9/11 Commission staff members in 2003.
In 1999, former Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Hugh Shelton, now retired, directed U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to develop a campaign plan to obtain intelligence on international terrorists.
The program, which began at the Army’s Land Information Warfare Center (LIWA), in Ft. Belvoir, Va., was transferred to defense contractor Raytheon’s Garland, Texas facility and finally to SOCOM in Tampa, Fla.
In 2005, Shaffer told Rep. Curt Weldon that SOCOM lawyers prevented the team from passing on information to the FBI about terrorists linked to a "Brooklyn cell."
At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing in September 2005, Erik Kleinsmith, a former Army major who worked at LIWA on the data-mining effort, said he was ordered in 2000 to delete 2.5 terabytes of computer data gathered on suspected terrorist.
The report found said the data, that contained the names of "U.S. persons," was destroyed in accordance with Defense Department policy.
The Times Herald broke the story after interviewing Shaffer in the congressman’s Capitol Hill office in June 2005. For the next several months, Weldon characterized "Able Danger" as a missed opportunity that could have thwarted the Sept. 11 terrorist plot and criticized the Pentagon for shutting down the program in 2000.
Weldon was zealous in championing Shaffer, who he believed had been blackballed by the DIA. The day before Shaffer was to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee in September 2005 his security clearance was revoked.
The inspector general’s report said testimony by Shaffer and "Able Danger" colleague, Navy Capt. Scott Phillpott, was riddled with inconsistencies. The military officers and a dozen others worked on the program.
After interviewing Shaffer, Phillpott and civilian intelligence analysts James D. Smith and Eileen Preisser, Pentagon IG investigators concluded their recollections of seeing charts with Atta’s picture or hearing his name prior to Sept. 11, 2001, lacked credibility.
"While we interviewed four witnesses who claimed to have seen a chart depicting (Atta) and possibly other terrorists of ‘cells’ involved in 9/11, we determined that their recollections were not accurate," the report said.
The 90-page report is full of peoples’ differing memories about the former intelligence effort.
During the program, the team mapped out linkages of al-Qaida members on several large paper charts.
In his first interview with Pentagon investigators, Phillpott testified he saw Atta’s picture on one of the charts, however, after being shown a memo he’d signed and the specific chart referred to in the correspondence, he changed his story.
"Well, I mean, obviously there’s a compelling amount of evidence that would make it appear that I did not see Mohamed Atta. I will absolutely grant you that based on what you’re showing me, my recollection could have been wrong," Phillpott admitted to investigators.
By the third interview the Navy officer stated "I’m convinced that Atta was not on that chart, the chart we had."
Shaffer insisted that he attempted to arrange three meeting between the program’s former director, Air Force Col. Robert Worthington, and the FBI to discuss strategies to disrupt terrorist activities.
Shaffer said he set up meeting through his FBI contact, Xanthie Mangum.
But Worthington denied the he was ever scheduled to meet with the FBI to discuss "Able Danger," even after investigators showed him a memo he prepared indicating Worthington planned "on going to LIWA and the FBI the latter part of the week."
In a statement made to FBI agents on Dec. 12, 2005, Mangum said she had "never received any requests to schedule meetings related to Able Danger."
When Pentagon investigators told Shaffer about Mangum’s denial, he insisted he spoke to someone at FBI to arrange meetings.
"It was either her or someone over there (FBI) that we made the meeting with," he testified.
Interviewed a week ago, Weldon said he planned to prepare a formal response to the Pentagon’s report.
"The harassment of (Lt. Col.) Shaffer was not looked into (thoroughly)," he said.
Shaffer’s attorney Mark Zaid was asked via e-mail why he thought the IG probe found no evidence of reprisal against his client by the DIA, despite significant circumstantial evidence.
"The (Department of Defense Office of Inspector General) selectively chose information to report on," he wrote in an e-mail message. "It gave significant weight to those who repeatedly changed their stories and failed to question motives, yet sought to penalize Shaffer for staying consistent."
Weldon also pointed out that Mangum, who was supposedly asked to set up meetings at the FBI, was not interviewed by Pentagon investigators.
The Seventh District Republican congressman, who is running against retired admiral Joe Sestak, a Democrat, said previously that Pentagon officials downplayed "Able Danger" revelations to avoid criticism about its failure to prevent the Sept. 11 attacks.
He also said both the Bush and Clinton administrations would feel political heat if the entire story came out.
"It’s a very complicated story," Weldon said. "It’s going to embarrass people in this (Bush) administration and the Clinton administration."
-Keith Phucas can be reached at kphucas@timesherald.com or 610-272-2500, ext. 211.