UPDATE: AJ Strata is now writing his analysis of today's hearings. His AD analyses are always top drawer and I'm sure this will be no exception. Be sure to read the whole thing.
I will be liveblogging the Able Danger/Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing at 2:30 PM today, in this post.
Witnesses:
- Cambone, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
- Mr. Erik Kleinsmith, Defense contractor
- Mr. Tony Shaffer, Department of Defense employee
- Mr. J.D. Smith, Defense contractor
The audio is to be streamed from this web page. Scroll down the page some and click on the radio image.
I hope to post the audio of this hearing this evening.
2:39 - the hearing begins, Able Danger story is complex, submittee is guided by Curt Weldon. Testimony will be both in open and closed session. No one person knows the whole picture. Asks that there be no speculation. Some people requested as witnesses declined to appear. There will be some inconsistencies in testimonies. Able Danger doesn't represent any major blunders by SOCOM, administrations. It's easy to say today that 9-11 may have been prevented. Able Danger, despite its promise, was a new untested program. At the time the alleged chart was produced, no data from Able Danger had been used. Able Danger continues to this time under a different name thanks to Gen. Pete Schoomaker.
2:42 PM - opening statements by committee co-chair: has never heard what significance Atta's name and photo pre-9/11, what difference that knowledge would have made. Will avoid discussion of classified materials.
2:45 PM - statement by Mr. Mehan: Able Danger (AD) represented best analytical efforts at the time. Those involved in AD and members of 9-11 commission are to be commended. The Commission identified correctly many deficiences prior to 9-11. (me-this man is defending the 9-11 Commission) The purpose of today's testimony is to improve our fighting of the GWOT.
2:45 PM - Mr. Ruiz (sp?): This hearing is to explore pre-9-11 intelligence gathering. AD created in late fall 1999 by former head of the Joint Chief Of Staff. Did AD uncover Atta information? Could AD have developed information about 9-11 plot? He's listening for any more structural changes that need to be made in US intelligence gathering.
2:50 PM - Announces the witnesses.
2:52 PM Mr. Stephen Cambone, a witness: Weldon called him expressing his concern about AD. Review in the dept. was initiated about AD. Have obligation to victims and families of 9-11/Cole/embassy bombings. They undertook a lengthy review with 90 personnel involved. Review conducted dept. wide and included Orion and Raytheon. None of those doing the reviewing had any knowledge of AD. No chart were discovered. No data, hard copy of soft, was discovered. That said, we do not have any evidence to say definitely if a chart ever existed. Did not find if data was inappropriately destroyed. What was AD? It was started by head of JCOS in 1999. AD was the unclassified name, a campaign plan was started. Campaign plan is the guidance, intent of the commander. Initial focus of project was exploitation of Al Qaeda vulnerabilities. Looking for links and patterns that could warn of possible future activities. JWAC (in Virginia) was approached. LIWA (in Virginia) was approached for its support in late 1999 and early 2000 time frame. Orion responded to LIWA requirements. Orion employees were not given access to AD information-Jan to Mar 2000. This is the period when chart might have been produced. A larger plan was developed and it now has the AD heritage. Did the Dept. inappropriately destroy information? LIWA's support to SOCOM wasn't in compliance with regulations, LIWA had to develop procedures for US persons, SOCOM had Raytheon purge its data later in 2000. Information was stored improperly. US persons was intermingled with other data and data was difficult to pull apart. Did LIWA produce Atta chart? 5 people say they did. Orion used open source information. Orion did produce charts. 5 Orion people say that no picture of Atta appeared on their charts. Chart prepared for use in a training course. Additional analysis would have had to be done. Army Intelligence has done data mining on open sources for the same time period. A large volume of data was searched. These searches did not discover the Atta picture/information. Did discover an Orion chart recently, the chart does contain a variation of Atta's name. One of the witnesses say that the photo he saw was grainy. Did AD information fail to be shared with the FBI? AD personnel could have used a chat room to get the information to the FBI. Later in 2000 the US persons regulations were in place. Was the Dept. responsive to 9-11 Commission requests for information? The Afghanistan discussions resulted in document requests. Documents were given to the commission. None of the information included Atta/chart information. No DOD information was withheld. The more recent review has found additonal information.
Summary: The DOD undertook its reviews as required. No Atta chart was found. AD was purged by various systems. FBI has denied that meetings were scheduled to pass AD information.
3:13 PM: Mr. Evert: FBI is not represented. Committee lacks knowledge about AD. Yields 10 minutes to Mr. Weldon.
3:15 PM: Mr. Weldon: Shaffer was within 2 days of losing his pay and his health care. That's been corrected by Rumsfeld/England. Thanks Dr. Cambone for coming. CIA wasn't using open source data in 1999. CIA 2 years before 9-11 said they didn't need that capability. Witnesses fear for their careers. Witnesses will testify that they had (AD) 4 of the terrorists/Brooklyn cell. Employees of the FBI will be asked to give statements. Why is AD important? 9-11 Commission calls AD historically insignificant. Louis Freeh said on Meet the Press that AD was the kind of information that could have prevented 9-11. Weldon lost friends in 9-11. One of the pilots of the planes was Weldon's neighbor and he had his throat slit. Weldon thought 9-11 Commission would completely investigate the attacks. LIWA had the right model. Some of the testimony has been disingenuous. Cambone said that he hasn't talked to the director of the Garland facility. They don't know the name of the director of the Garland facility that Cambone's group talked to. None of these DOD people have even talked to Dr. Bob Johnson. Has all of the Garland data also been destroyed? Cambone told that only a fraction of the LIWA information transferred to Garland. Weldon: LIWA information was found in a file cabinet 3 weeks ago. In the last month a current employee has data mined pre 9/11 information and has found: 800 hits of Atta name, 5 hits with Mohammad Atta. Weldon has this person's name.
3:26 PM - Mr. Meehan: Asks Cambone what AD techniques have gained. What are the significant draw backs? Cambone says that the problems are that using open source information, certain inappropriate information can be gleaned. Cambone doesn't recall a meeting with Shaffer. He remembers the subject of the meeting and that it wasn't AD. Yields his time to Weldon.
3:28 PM - Mr. Weldon: This isn't about finger pointing. It's about letting the US people know what we knew before 9-11. If there are bureacrats who get embarrassed, the US people still need to know. Zelikow says he never met with Shaffer in Bagram or any other place, but Shaffer has his business card. Does Cambone agree with 9-11 Commission that AD was historically insignificant? Cambone says that the Commission did a service. A former employee of Cambone's told someone on a plane that Cambone's group had no intention of investigating AD, that there was nothing to AD. Zelikow told Shaffer that they were very anxious to meet with him. Later, they refused to meet with Shaffer. Dieter Snell is not allowed to testify by Elliot Spitzer. How could there have been a full investigation when no one even knows who runs/ran the Garland facility. All Weldon wants is the truth.
3:37 PM - Mr. Ruiz (sp?): Bob Johnson can be called as a witness if there are future hearings. Zelikow did request that the 9-11 Commission staff get AD information, this is on a document. Confusing how Zelikow was interested in AD and then denies ever having met Shaffer in Bagram. We need to find out the facts. Cambone says there's no reason not to disclose AD information. The AD campaign plan was rolled into a larger campaign effort. It was a success.
3:49 PM - Mr. Tom Gandy: Addresses the Army's search of data. Asked by chairman how others found searched pre-9/11 data and found Atta's name but his searches didn't. Gandy did his search from 1999 to May 2000. His search found no hits for the Mohammad Atta. Another witness says that SOCOM's system most closely matches the AD capability. Using that library of information, no hits were found.
3:53 PM - Mr. Weldon: Weldon says that the runs he's talking about were done in the last 2 months. In that data set there were many many Atta hits. Weldon will say who it was who did the data run when he's assured that that individual's career won't be ruined. On 2/3/2006 3 people in the DoD went into a file cabinet with AD information. Cambone's people say that the file cabinet contained no AD data. The data delivered to 9-11 Commission wasn't the same data that was in Shaffer's office. Another new retiree now agrees that he identified Atta pre-9/11. Neither administration wants the AD story to be told.
4:03 PM - Mr. Cambone: The DoD has no objection to this story being laid out to the people of the US. The personnel who investigated this are not the enemies. There have been no vendettas to destroy anyone's career. Cambone says he is a man of his word. (me: said with an attitude and arrogance)
4:05 PM - Ms. Tauscher: AD is complex, asks for whistle blower policy. She is concerned about intimidation of Tony Shaffer.
4:15 PM - Ms. McKinney: asks 3 questions as to whether Clarridge (sp?)/Zelikow/Franklin/Pearl worked on AD. She asks if there's a joint data mining operation between NSA and DIA. Cambone says that the 2 agencies share information.
4:18 PM - Mr. Weldon: AD found 5 global hot spots. Cambone agrees. After AD ID's these spots, how could anyone classify AD as historically insignificant? Sailors were killed in 1 of the 5 ID'd hot spots (USS Cole). Cambone doesn't answer. He says that for himself, that there was a lot of info from that period, and that he doesn't know that AD was the only generator of that information. 1 of the 5 ID's cells was in Aiden, Yemen. AD information was taken into other projects. Weldon doesn't know how Cambone can sit there and deny that people haven't been harrassed. Blitzer at CNN told Weldon's staff that DoD staff had called him and told him that Shaffer was having an affair with someone on Weldon's staff. How can we say that DoD hasn't tried to smear Shaffer.
4:25 PM - Mr. Langevin: asks a few questions and yields his time to Weldon.
4:28 PM - 5 minute break in recording to transfer audio file to PC.
4:33 PM - Recording resumes.
4:35 PM - Mr. Weldon: The 90 day rule was not followed. The DoD lawyer, Dr. Bob Johnson, told Weldon that Richard Shiffrin told him, don't worry how long you keep the data. That contradicts what they were told in the hearing. Reads a quote from the DIA web site, talks about having a responsiblity to discern truth.
4:36 PM - Mr. Cambone: Responds to Weldon's last statement. If there was a cavalier attitude, it was inappropriate and it shouldn't be happening. There were questions as to whether things were done properly at LIWA.
4:38 PM - End of the first panel. Cambone will participate in closed session this evening.
4:39 PM - 2nd panel begins, consists of Kleinsmith, Shaffer and others.
4:40 PM - Mr. Kleinsmith: was chief of intelligence for LIWA when SOCOM requested LIWA support. LIWA wasn't an intelligence unit. His branch had 24 analysts. Had unique capabilities, supported every combatant command several times. Coordinated with SOCOM for AD. He doesn't remember Atta's name/face on a specific chart, but they were generating many many charts and tracking many people. He was told to cease activities because of data mining concerns. No one he knows can say where the cease order originated from. Was higher up than SOCOM. There was a May 2000 work stoppage. They were barred from working from any of the data. All data had to go.
4:45 PM - Lt. Col. Shaffer: AD was the right mission at the right time with the right enemy. This was not merely a planning exercise as has been characterized here previously. AD was resurrection of OSS capability. Zelikow called Shaffer back that very evening in Afghanistan. The best and brightest were brought together, this was an important project. AD was a true capability to deal with a developing enemy. He matched up LIWA and SOCOM. Used capabilities for whatever made sense. The FBI agent in question told the Jud. confirmed that Shaffer tried to meet with the FBI. Shaffer was working with the FBI in a parallel operation at the time. There were other linkages that were established (Shaffer disagrees with Cambone). Shaffer was questioned 2 days ago by the DIA. There have been issues of intimidation and Shaffer hasn't been pushed to come forward. Shaffer told today he won't have counsel in closed session. Cambone's DIA has denied him representation. He will support Congress and its efforts.
4:50 PM - Mr. Smith: detailed description of project, claims of Slade Gorton.
4:59 PM - Kleinsmith followed the regulation and purged the data. The picture of Atta next to Rahman's (sp?) photo was extremely valuable. He showed people the chart while it was in his possession. He kept a copy of the chart in his office. The picture was grainy. Showed Atta as 3rd level terrorist linked to Rahman. Size of chart meant there could be no copies made. Created chart from Orion Magic software. Could be created if the DB still existed. He's been told that DB is gone. Shaffer says he was working with FBI special agent (female) that's been referred to here. Could she get him a point of contact. Shaffer gave that information to his deputy. She was his AD deputy. Tried 3 times to arrange a meeting. (Listen to audio here, I missed the details.) There's something about a Waco concern being the reason that the information wasn't passed to the FBI-2000 time frame. SOCOM had concerns about the Brooklyn cell because they were here legally-expanded to green card holders at the time.
5:09 PM - Mr. Ruiz: Shaffer found legal ways to bring intelligence information to SOCOM. FBI was different as they are law enforcement. Made recommendations through 2000 that AD partner with the FBI. That wasn't the feeling of SOCOM. Nothing technically prohibited this information sharing, it was a SOCOM operational call. Shaffer respected SOCOM's decision. Significant information was shared with the FBI about another target set.
5:15 PM - Announcement that a closed session witness has to appear at the White House at 6 PM. Weldon says that this panel needs to testify in open session, either now or later today. Ms. McKinney says that she wants to ask questions also. Weldon is given only 10 minutes to ask questions, also McKinney. Weldon objects strongly since Cambone was given so much time, that this panel is unfairly being cut short.
5:17 PM - Shaffer says he has met Zelikow. Shaffer was later told the commission didn't want to talk to him. (Shaffer is hampered seriously here because the DoD will not give him access to his email) Each of the witnesses state that the AD information could have prevented 9-11. Shaffer states that there was never an adequate investigation of AD. Atta's photo was from an Arab source. The 9-11 Commission never talked to Kleinsmith or Smith.
5:28 PM - Good news announced that the witness has agreed to stay.
5:28 PM - Ms. McKinney: She says it's incredible that 3 witnesses are here saying that 9-11 could have been prevented. Shaffer says that Gandy was incorrect in what he said under oath about what information could be retained by the government. The AD information could legally be retained indefinitely. A CIA operative told Shaffer that if AD succeeded it would steal CIA thunder and they would not cooperate.
5:35 PM - Gen. Lambert was very upset that his data had been purged. Weldon says that the LIWA information was destroyed because people in DC were upset about the China data. Weldon asks if there are people who want this story covered up. Shaffer/Smith all agree that there are people who will do anything to cover up this story. Smith has lost 2 jobs already. Kleinsmith cannot say. Shaffer confirms that he was extremely close to being fired. Shaffer briefed the deputy director of CIA in January 2000 and it included AD information. He left his own office and said that he couldn't see the information. Shaffer is aware of the AD/USS Cole information. 2 weeks before the Cole attack, AD found there were activities of interest in the port of Aiden. Philpott gave the information to the proper authorities and he asked that actions be taken. The Cole commander's career has been placed on hold. The commander said that he would not have tone to that port if he had had any idea of the dangers there. Kleinsmith does not remember seeing the photo of Atta on a chart, but 100's of names were coming out at that time. Kleinsmith agrees that the issue is not about a chart. Smith agrees. Smith thinks this is an embarrassment to the current establishment. The terrorist ties in the US in 1999 were unbelievable.
5:49 PM - The room will be swept. The closed session will begin in about 30 minutes.
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